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Introduction
Shortly after the Asian economic crisis began in 1997, a consensus emerged among
multilateral agencies, academics, journalists, politicians and various international business
figures as to what it signified: fundamental institutional shortcomings in the region. On this
basis, reforms to achieve good governance, transparency, rule of law, civil society and or
democracy have been widely recommended. Important differences exist within this
consensus, but the common ingredient is a view that sustainable market systems entail
universal social and political preconditions. This, it is argued, is what Asian policymakers
have to come to terms with.
The new emphasis on transparency is a particularly interesting dimension of the push for
institutional reform. Its advocacy is central to the notion that markets have certain functional
prerequisites, especially as they become more sophisticated. The collapse in international
confidence in Asian markets was widely understood as at least compounded, if not in part
caused, by the absence of accurate and reliable market information (Devinney 1998: 36). As
World Bank head, Jim Wolfensohn (quoted in Stiglitz 1999), asserts, ‘free markets cannot
work behind closed doors’. The same thinking underscores International Monetary Fund
(IMF) rescue packages in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea which enforce new routine
public disclosures on authorities of assorted economic and financial data.1 Apart from the
immediate utility of improved information to market decisions, it is also regarded as essential
to better public policy through the informed discussion and debate it facilitates (Anjaria 1999:
1).
All of this begs the question of just what role the institution of the media might play within
new regimes of transparency in Asia. Historically, a free press has played a pivotal role in the
public dissemination of information and debate in the advanced market economies of liberal
democracies. According to World Bank Vice President for East Asia and the Pacific, Jean-
Michel Severino (1999), the same holds true of Asia. A free press, he argues, can reduce the
likelihood that market decisions will be based on ‘emotion and herd instinct’ by availing
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investors of speedier and more reliable information. No less important, though, is the role of
the press in exposing corruption and collusive dealings of the sort that accompanied the Asian
crisis.2
Transparency is impossible to separate from politics (Florini 1999) – especially once it starts
to embrace the concept of a free press and challenges the capacity of authoritarian
governments to control public discourse.3 Understandably, then, the concept has an appeal
well beyond its instrumental value to more sustainable market systems in Asia. Political and
social activists hope to harness the idea of greater transparency to democratisation, and the
case for extended citizenship rights can now be argued on the grounds of economic necessity.
The World Bank’s linking of transparency and press freedom to a wider endorsement of civil
society appears to encourage this.4
These observations about transparency invite broad questions concerning the relationship
between market development and social and political institutions in Asia. Are the imperatives
of globalisation likely to enforce transparency reforms and fundamentally challenge existing
power structures? Or are some sorts of transparency reform and information availability more
important to the market than others? And where does the institution of a free press feature in
this – is it inseparable from transparency reform or an optional extra? In effect, is
authoritarian rule, which by definition entails the suppression of a free press, capable of
accommodating pressures for transparency without transforming itself?
These issues will be explored below via examination of Singapore and Malaysia. Both
involve highly internationalised economies where, until very recently, authoritarianism and
successful market development have gone hand in hand. Transparency and press freedom
have been conspicuous by their absence. Yet in the last few years, government leaders and
policymakers have embraced the rhetoric of transparency and enacted or foreshadowed a
series of reforms in transparency’s name. In particular, these governments are attempting to
reassure international business that fiscal and corporate transparency reforms are high on their
agendas. However, in neither country is there anything like a relaxation of the constraints on
the press. On the contrary, authorities are exploring new means of intimidating and
containing critical and investigative reporting.
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We are witnessing an interesting experiment wherein selective corporate and fiscal forms of
transparency are countenanced while others that entail political openness are resisted. If the
current orthodoxy on transparency is correct then this quarantining exercise will fail.
However, there are signs that transparency in general, and the role of a free press in particular,
may be regarded as less important by international business than it is by the champions of
global economic liberalism advocating its adoption. The limited nature and scale of
transparency reforms thus far has not prevented an impressive recovery of business
confidence in these markets. The importance of transparency reform is evidently mediated or
outweighed by other factors.
Transparency Rhetoric and Reform
In recognition of the broad consensus on the importance of transparency to participation in a
globalised market system, Asian political leaders have been anxious to express their
commitment to the concept. In the case of Singapore, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew (quoted
in Straits Times 1999a) quickly got on the offensive to assert that: ‘Because we are what we
are, open and transparent, investors have confidence in us. The investors assess the situation
and say, yes, this is a government and system that will continue to tick in an honest and
efficient way’. In conflating transparency with the absence of corruption, Lee was trying to
put Singapore in the best possible light. Meanwhile, though, Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime
Minister and chief of Singapore’s de facto central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore
(MAS), was busy developing plans to give greater substance to his father’s claims.
Policymakers in the city-state perceived the Asian crisis as an opportunity to extend a
regional edge in the finance sector while its competitors were weakened. Thus they forged
ahead with plans just prior to the crisis to elevate Singapore to the status of an international
financial centre. This added impetus to the case for transparency reform. After all, the free
flow and transparency of information is characteristic of the world’s premier financial centres
London and New York.
In neighbouring Malaysia, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, Anwar
Ibrahim (1998), was forthright about the need for change: ‘The crisis has compelled
governments to accept the need for transparency and the necessity of making adjustments and
instituting reform, no matter how painful. They must swallow the bitter pill’. Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohammed and some of his senior colleagues were less inclined to endorse ‘bitter
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pills’ – especially where these threatened the political basis of the United Malay National
Organisation (UMNO), the leading party in the ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional
(National Front). But internal UMNO machinations leading to Anwar’s expulsion - and his
subsequent detention, trial and imprisonment – did not jettison official transparency rhetoric.
While Malaysia’s leaders rejected austere IMF recovery prescriptions and embarked on
capital controls, declared support for transparency has survived. As Deputy Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi (quoted in Emmanuel 1999) explained: ‘Good governance and transparency
are two prerequisites if Malaysia is to improve its competitiveness and inspire confidence
against increasing globalisation’. The National Economic Recovery Plan (1998) produced by
the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) - whose Executive Director, Tun Daim
Zainuddin, succeeded Anwar as Finance Minister - also calls for a range of measures to
improve transparency and the regulatory environment.
In both Singapore and Malaysia, a number of concrete reforms have in fact accompanied
these unprecedented expressions of support for transparency. In particular, there have been
changes within the banking and financial sectors to enhance information and data availability
to the market, as well as more general attempts to raise the quality and degree of corporate
disclosures.
The Singapore government’s strategy to transform the city-state into a comprehensive global
financial centre includes fund and risk management, as well as foreign exchange, equity and
bond markets.  When the crisis hit, the international concern about the extent and reliability
of market information in Asia necessarily affected Singapore. One of the first measures
adopted to address this was to require Singapore’s banks to reveal the extent of non-
performing loans (NPLs). In the absence of this sort of information, Singapore banks were
being tarred with the same brush as considerably less sound counterparts in the region.5
Subsequently, the government also appointed the Committee on Banking Disclosure (1998)
to recommend standards and practices within the sector. The committee, comprising leading
financial players, recommended more information be required in the following areas:
undisclosed reserves; accounting practices; profit-and-loss accounting; balance sheets;
supplementary information; financial review; and equity accounting. In accepting all the
recommendations, Lee Hsien Loong proclaimed that ‘MAS will ensure that our own
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disclosure and reporting requirements meet international best practice’ (quoted in Straits
Times Weekly Edition 1999a).6
Other more general improvements in information that were initiated before the crisis came
into effect, but these were reinforced or hastened by the new climate. This included
Singapore’s compliance with the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS)
requirements, under which a wide range of basic economic information is viewable on the
IMF’s website.7 In late 1999, the Department of Statistics also began releasing more detailed
information through its Quarterly Economic Survey as a result of an updated Singapore
Standard Industrial Classification (SSIC). Among other things, it now provides more
extensive sectoral economic statistics by decomposing gross domestic product (GDP) into
nine major sectors instead of the previous five.8 In recent years, the statistical information
posted on the MAS web page has also become quite extensive. It includes data on non-
performing loans by Singapore banks.
In the case of Malaysia, concerns about ‘crony capitalism’ were considerably heightened by
the economic crisis (Khoo 2000). Close relations in Malaysia between local political and
business elites had already aroused criticism, among other things, about the way state
contracts were dispensed, who benefited from privatisation, and how regulations were
enforced or ignored. With the crisis, commentators quickly stepped up condemnation of
opaque deals and inconsistent institutional and regulatory practices. By contrast, the
Singapore government enjoyed a reputation for presiding over tightly enforced business
regulations and a serious and effective commitment to the elimination of corruption. The
restoration of business confidence in Malaysia thus faced greater challenges.
Interestingly, as with Singapore, some initiatives towards improved data provision had begun
in Malaysia just before the crisis. In both cases, this was part of the attempt to attract mobile
international capital, especially to local stock and financial markets, and was encouraged by
the IMF. Thus, while Anwar was Finance Minister, Bank Negara Malaysia agreed in 1996 to
abide by the SDDS. Despite his political demise, the commitment was implemented in 1999.
Measures announced after the crisis broke included the declaration in March 1998 of steps to
promote transparency in the dissemination of financial and corporate statistics by the key
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public sector data collecting agencies. The National Economic Recovery Plan (NEAC 1998:
67), released in August 1998, also recommended that: ‘A more liberal approach should be
followed in the dissemination of statistics and the parameters of confidentiality should be
narrowly defined’. It thus called for a review of the Statistics Act, 1965 to ensure a ‘greater
flow of information to the users’, and the restructuring of the Department of Statistics to
‘strengthen its role in the collection, processing and dissemination of data for public
consumption’ (NEAC 1998: 86).
Significantly, the Plan also placed emphasis on the need for better public relations. It
recommended consultants be employed in image building: ‘Relevant strategic audiences
would be targeted with the message that Malaysia should be differentiated from other
emerging countries in various ways, including its economic fundamentals, finance sector
resilience, and political stability, and its commitment to act on reforms’ (NEAC 1998: 65).
Indeed, the month before the Plan was officially published in August 1998, the NEAC
established a Communications Team, a privately contracted group of young public relations
experts educated at English universities. The Communications Team has been heavily
involved in both initiatives towards greater transparency and the maximisation of the impact
of such changes on investors’ perceptions of Malaysia. It is required to ‘keep the media,
interested parties such as fund managers and financial analysts, as well as the general public
aware of the issues surrounding the efforts towards economic recovery’ (Daim 1999).
Public relations motives notwithstanding, the new approach has brought some gains to the
quality, range and availability of information relevant to market decisions. The NEAC
Communication Team was also instrumental in the abolition of longstanding discrimination
in the release of quarterly economic indicators to local and international media organisations.9
Up until mid-1999, the Department of Statistics (DOS) exclusively released basic data on the
GDP, the consumer price index (CPI), industrial production and trade to the state news
agency, Bernama. Reports by journalists in local media organisations often contained errors
of interpretation and omitted material of interest to business clients of international media
organisations. As from June, data were faxed from DOS to both local and international media
organisations simultaneously and with a common embargo. This made for more independent
and timely reports by the wire services to financial markets.
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As in Singapore, Malaysian authorities tightened disclosure rules for banks soon after the
financial crisis hit. Subsequently, more comprehensive prescriptions on corporate governance
reforms were endorsed in the Report on Corporate Governance, released in March 1999. This
makes a wide range of recommendations pertaining to the regimes for public-listed
companies, intended to strengthen investor protections, increase directors’ responsibilities,
and raise the level and standard of information to shareholders and prospective investors.
However, no time frame has been attached to the programme of reforms. In the same month
the Report was released, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) announced new
requirements for public-listed companies to publish quarterly financial and corporate reports,
replacing the existing half-yearly practice. The Securities Commission has also begun a
phased move towards a full disclosure-based regulation system in the capital market by 2001.
This survey of developments in Singapore and Malaysia indicates that respective
governments are eager to project themselves as committed to transparency reform. But just
how deep are reforms, and what is the likelihood of a generalised shift towards more
transparent economies and polities over time?
The Limits to Reform
Before answering this question, it must be underlined that both countries start transparency
reforms from very low bases. The Singapore government points to high rankings in the
annual Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International (TI), a Berlin-
based independent watchdog organisation. In the same exercise, Malaysia consistently ranks
poorly. However, these results are simply produced by asking business people how much
corruption they perceive in a country. That is not at all a measure of transparency – whether
defined in terms of information availability, the visibility of state or corporate policy
processes and decision-making, or in broader terms of political openness. As David Mason
(1999), a partner in an international accounting firm in Singapore for fourteen years,
observes: ‘Singapore has the reputation of being one of the worst places in Asia for corporate
disclosures, despite its overall good record on governance rules’. Similarly, IMF directors
observed in a Public Information Notice (No. 99/26) in March 1999 that ‘policy analysis
could be enhanced by making more transparent the fiscal and monetary policy frameworks’.
The Notice added that directors ‘encouraged the authorities to improve data on consolidated
public sector operations and on medium-term fiscal projections, as well as on external trade,
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reserves, and government assets held abroad’. In both countries, however, it is the opaqueness
of state activities and the associated resistance to political openness that poses the most
fundamental obstacle to transparency.
In Singapore, policymakers and bureaucrats view control over information as part of their
strategic management. Information is not seen as a public good, but something to be
harnessed to the commercial and political ends of the state. Moreover, citizenship claims
about the right to information represent a threat to the PAP’s paternal political culture. The
government, therefore, has different attitudes to pragmatic market pressures for increased
information, and what it regards as political demands. The lack of transparency within state
institutions is all the more significant given the enormous direct and indirect influence they
exert over the Singapore economy.
One aspect of the strategic control of information involves operations by government and
government-linked companies (GLCs). For the far greater part, investment detail is shielded
from detailed public record or scrutiny. The Government Investment Corporation (GIC)
manages in excess of S$100 billion of taxpayers’ money in overseas investments, while its
sister firm Temasek Holdings presides over S$34 billion, mostly invested through the more
than one thousand GLCs. Under Singapore’s legal and regulatory regimes, both are exempted
from routine external reviews of operations. The GIC is particularly secretive, outside the
purview of the Auditor General and Accountant General and with no requirement to report to
parliament. It only reports to its board, chaired by Lee Kuan Yew. Temasek reports
selectively and only to the Finance Minister and a small parliamentary budget committee
(Vennewald 1994). Full enumeration of its portfolio and its performance is thus not publicly
discussed.10
Strategic control of information extends to some basic economic data, one of the clearest
cases being the suppression of Singapore-Indonesia trade figures. Their publication would
invite comparison with Indonesian records and may reveal discrepancies that expose
smuggling into the city-state, not to mention the extent to which the official embargo on trade
with Indonesia during Konfrontasi (Confrontation) in the 1960s was observed. These
sensitive political considerations stand in the way of disclosures that would contribute to a
more accurate picture of Singapore’s current account surplus and capital flows.11 Attempts to
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get around the political controls over basic data through investigative journalism are fraught
with danger, notably risk of prosecution under the Official Secrets Act (OSA).12 Freedom of
information legislation to open up access to state-controlled files is certainly not on the
reform agenda either.
The difficulty of obtaining information from state institutions was ironically highlighted in
1999 by a controversy involving outgoing President Ong Teng Cheong. The President’s
constitutional responsibilities include safeguarding of Singapore’s official reserves. At the
press conference announcing his decision not to seek a further term, Ong complained about
the protracted and unsatisfactory process of simply obtaining information about the reserves.
His request of the Accountant-General was met with the response that ‘it would take 52 man
years’ to produce the list of physical assets which made up the reserves (Zuraidah 1999). He
claimed to have received something nearly three years later (Hamilton 1999). When someone
with the authority of an Elected President has such experiences, the problem of opening up
information access obviously has to address deeply embedded and institutionalised state
practices and culture.
The PAP government’s sudden rhetorical embrace of transparency nevertheless represents a
potential political opportunity for advocates of greater political openness in Singapore. Thus
far, however, endeavours to exploit this rhetoric and engage the government over the concept
have been limited and ineffective. An attempt at this was initiated in May 1999 when two of
the city-state’s most prominent opposition leaders, Chee Soon Juan of the Singapore
Democratic Party (SDP) and Joshua Jeyaretnam of the Workers’ Party (WP), established the
Open Singapore Centre (OSC). The press release that accompanied this announcement read:
‘Transparency and democratic accountability, whether in the public or private sector, will not
come about unless we have an open society with accurate and verifiable information available
to the citizens at all times’. In a letter to Jeyaretnam, though, Tan Tee How, Principal Prime
Secretary to the Prime Minister, asserted there ‘is no need for your Open Singapore Centre’
and that ‘Singapore is already widely recognised as an open society which practises
transparency and democratic accountability’.13 The OSC’s opening meeting also appeared to
be the subject of surveillance by internal security agents (Gomez 1999), hardly encouraging
for other would be activists on this issue.
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In Malaysia, state institutions have also largely been insulated from any general reform that
would enhance serious scrutiny of the bureaucracy. However, this is less symptomatic of a
coherent conception and execution of strategic information control as in Singapore, but
equally a reflection of political resistance to citizenship claims. Moreover, contradictory
stances on a range of disclosure and regulatory issues have fuelled a growing perception that,
in the name of transparency and improved governance, government opponents and their
associates have been the subject of political persecution.
As in Singapore, access to and possession of information continues to be circumscribed by an
OSA. This means that none of the recent regulatory and information improvements, nor those
projected in both the National Economic Recovery Plan and the Report on Corporate
Governance, will change the fact that authorities continue to have considerable capacity to
suppress information. Under the Act, a Head of Department has the incontestable discretion
to determine what constitutes an ‘official secret’. Neither is official sensitivity over
information about the activities of GLCs and statutory bodies, and particularly the terms and
conditions of the various privatisations and mega-deals involving them in recent years, any
less acute today than before the crisis. GLCs enjoy similar exceptions from public scrutiny to
their counterparts in Singapore, though not the same reputation for commercial hardness.
Khazanah Holdings, the Malaysian counterpart to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, reports
only to the Finance Minister and not parliament, although investing huge amounts of
taxpayers’ money.14 Similarly, the national oil company, Petronas, reports directly to the
Prime Minister’s office and its accounts are not lodged with parliament. Instead of full annual
reports, it releases abbreviated financial information. Even one of its founders and retired
managing director, Rastam Hadi, now asks: ‘is there any country in the world where revenues
like [US]$10 billion a year get spent without knowledge of parliament?’ (quoted in
Jayasankaran 1999: 11).
Hopes that the new emphasis on transparency might oblige the government to be more
forthcoming on information about its controversial mega-projects have also been
disappointed. One of the most significant and opaque cases concerns the Bakun Dam. The
non-government organisation SUARAM (People’s Voice of Malaysia) has made this a
special focus. It has called on the government to be transparent about the cost of the project,
the tenders for the contracts’ as well as reveal why Ekran Berhad Hydroelectric Corporation
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received RM950 million compensation from the government over the project. These appeals
have been ignored. The Anti Corruption Agency (ACA), which operates within the Prime
Minister’s Department, and the SC have also been criticised for what many see as selective
investigations and prosecutions. So far, for example, nothing has transpired from
investigations begun in October 1996 into alleged misappropriation of funds by government
politicians associated with the Perwaja Steel project.15 Similarly, serious allegations by
Anwar against senior government figures have not translated into charges by the ACA.
However, public revelations about the ACA’s investigations into these cases by Anwar ally
Mohamed Ezam Mohamed Nor led to him being charged under the OSA (Wong 2000).16.
Similarly, in July 1999, former Assistant Governor of Bank Negara and Anwar associate,
Abdul Murad Khalid, was charged with failure to declare assets worth RM24 million (Lopez
1999). The SC also charged Ishak Ismail, the head of KFC Holdings and Idris Hydraulic, and
Wan Hasni Wan Sulaiman of Abrar Corp for allegedly breaching securities laws – both
believed to be connected to Anwar (Toh 1999).17
In yet another demonstration that the practice on transparency lagged behind the rhetoric,
Cabinet decided in August 1999 to block any public availability of the Air Pollutant Index to
avoid adverse publicity that would ‘drive away tourists’. In recent years Malaysia has suffered
the annual problem of smoke from forest fires in Indonesia. The firm monitoring air quality
was told that its data were not for public consumption, and a clause in its agreement with the
government pertaining to ‘official secrets’ was drawn to its attention (Wong 1999).18
Finally, one of the most alarming and revealing indicators of the gap between transparency
rhetoric and the actual commitment to reform was provided by a survey conducted by the
Kuala Lumpur Society for Transparency & Integrity in late 1999. The questionnaire was sent
to 19 registered political parties to ascertain their stances on transparency and accountability.
It included such fundamental questions as whether or not: there should be declarations of
assets by politicians and senior public servants to an all-party parliamentary committee; the
ACA should be granted more independence; there should be transparency in the awarding of
government contracts; there should be an independent Electoral Commission; the OSA
should be repealed. Even though an election was imminent, only four parties replied - all
members of the Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front).19 Neither UMNO nor any other
member of the ruling coalition responded.
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These shortfalls obviously put the shifts towards greater transparency outlined earlier into
context. Nevertheless, social and political activists, as well as some elements of the private
sector and bureaucracy, are attempting to capitalise on the government’s rhetoric. This is also
a great deal more extensive and effective a process than in Singapore. Through the Kuala
Lumpur Society for Transparency & Integrity, Malaysia has an established independent
watchdog with world-wide credibility and networks. The organisation has been active
through press statements and opinion pieces in the local press, not to mention through the
surveys and studies it undertakes. In a less conspicuous way, professional organisations such
as the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance and the Institute of Public Listed
Companies have expressed views on government advisory bodies, such as the National
Consultative Committee. They have particularly pushed for improved protections for minority
shareholding interests. In Bank Negara and the Securities Commission, and within the
constraints of the power that they operate, there are also professional and bureaucratic
elements pushing for improved systems of transparency and accountability. However, in the
absence of committed bureaucratic and political leadership their influence is constrained.20
Most significantly, opposition political parties and NGOs with broad political agendas have
seized on the discourse about transparency and good governance. The Barisan Alternatif
identified the ‘enhancement of government transparency and accountability’ as one of its six
main objectives in its Joint Manifesto for the 1999 general election. The newly formed
Malaysian Democratic Party (MDP) committed itself to ‘transparency and accountability at
all levels of government and privatised bodies’ (New Straits Times 1999a). A People’s
Manifesto (1999) involving 10 NGOs also demanded that: ‘Civil institutions such as the
Attorney-General’s (AG’s) office, the Judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), the
police, the Election Commission and the Human Rights Commission, must be independent,
transparent and accountable to the public’. Similarly, a joint statement by 11 major ethnic
Chinese organisations - and endorsed by hundreds of others - which contained 17 reform
proposals, declared at the outset that ‘we are very concerned about corruption, deviations in
the implementation of government policies, lack of accountability and transparency’.
Thematic reform prescriptions among parties and NGOs included: the repeal of the OSA and
the Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA); the introduction of a Freedom of
Information Act; mandatory declarations of assets by senior public servants and MPs;
increased independence for the ACA; and greater public accountability for GLCs.
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This focus on transparency is likely to be an ongoing feature of opposition politics. Shortly
after the election, the Barisan Alternatif issued a media statement through its Official
Spokesman, Rustam Sani (1999), reading: ‘The support that we received from all the major
ethnic communities give us hope that they share our vision for a Malaysia founded on the
principles of justice, transparency and fair-play’.
What we have seen thus far is that in both Singapore and Malaysia the reform content
governments attach to the concept of transparency has been narrow. Certainly there is more
responsiveness to practical concerns about business information needs than to broader
appeals for political openness. But where does this leave press freedom? Surely the very
information needs of business pose a threat to tight media control. After all, the fastest
growing area of media product expansion – in Asia as elsewhere – is in the provision of
business products (Rodan 1998). In the interests of speedier and more reliable information,
should we not expect a pragmatic, even if begrudging, loosening up of controls on the media?
Resisting Media Freedom
Instead of the crisis opening up the scope for greater press freedom, there has actually been a
hardening of the resolve by governments in Singapore and Malaysia to limit critical and
investigative reporting. Indeed, Malaysian authorities and business elites seem to have drawn
instruction from the successful Singapore strategy of media control. Increasingly, legal
intimidation combines with sophisticated public relations exercises to limit the extent and
impact of critical reporting.
Well before the Asian crisis, Singapore’s experience contradicted the idea of market
development as a force for media freedom. As a result of enforced closures in the early 1970s
and amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA) in 1974, independent
domestic media had been largely replaced by government-controlled organisations. Local
media have thus long been harnessed to what is officially described as ‘nation building’ (Lent
1984, Seow 1998). From the mid-1980s, attention turned to the international media. A series
of costly libel, defamation and contempt of court cases then combined with circulation
restrictions imposed under further revisions in 1986 to the NPPA to tame the international
press (Rodan 1998). The Minister for Communications was empowered to limit circulation
where reporting was deemed to constitute ‘interference in domestic politics’.
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Authorities have been especially sensitive to reporting on alleged government corruption or
nepotism, and any questioning of the independence of the judiciary. Insistence on the
government’s right of fully published replies to critical reporting is another theme to clashes
with the international press. Annual publishing permits add to the difficulties for the media,
encouraging caution not to jeopardise renewal. Journalists have also become aware that a
comprehensive network of official monitoring and surveillance of their work and
communications exists, involving MITA, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Internal
Security Department. The net effect of all this has been widespread self-censorship. Indeed,
over the last decade, remarkable increases in market sophistication have gone hand in hand
with reductions in critical reporting.
In the last few years, though, the capacity of authorities to reconcile press censorship with
market development has faced new questions. For one thing, the Asian crisis has focused
minds more sharply on the extent, quality and timeliness of information. For another, the
clamp on information flows could be more problematic for investors in the finance sector
than manufacturing. Fund managers, stock brokers and their clients, for example, often
require daily information on, and analyses of, variables affecting investment. Thus far,
however, all we have witnessed is a consolidation of existing relations between state and
media.
Since the crisis, the government-owned Television Corporation of Singapore (TCS) has
launched an 18-hour all-news television channel - Channel News Asia (CNA). CNA began
broadcasting as a free-to-air domestic service in March 1999, with plans to go regional in the
future. The express purpose of the new station, as explained by the then Minister for
Information, George Yeo, is to provide an ‘Asian viewpoint’ on current events (Dolvin &
Granites 1999: 48). This initiative may be intended to pre-empt domestic aspirations for
general access to satellite television in Singapore. Ratings surveys revealed a strong public
demand for more news and information once the regional crisis began (Borsuk 1998). But as
Yeo observed: ‘People are not going to wait till 10.30 for the news. If the news is not on,
people will search for information elsewhere. We might as well be the one to provide that
information’ (quoted in Tan 1999). More particularly, the government views with alarm the
enhanced stature and influence of foreign satellite television arising out of coverage of the
tumultuous events in the immediate neighbourhood. Yeo remarked in parliament on 12 May
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1999: ‘Just look at the way foreign channels have become part of the domestic politics in
Malaysia and Indonesia. We should worry for ourselves.’ Of more direct political
significance, the Singapore government was especially irritated by international media
coverage of oppositionist Chee Soon Juan, twice jailed in early 1999 for speaking in a public
place without a permit.21 Yeo put foreign television stations on notice that there will need to
be less coverage of government critics by the time of the next election. 22
The driving force behind the government’s push to make Singapore an international finance
centre, Lee Hsien Loong, shows no signs either of embracing a more open and critical media.
He recently rejected the claim that debate is stifled, pointing to the letters to the editor
published in The Straits Times and Singapore-hosted discussion groups on the Internet to
illustrate his point (Tang 1999). His colleagues have been more forceful in dismissing the
prospects of change. In late 1999, Minister for Home Affairs, Wong Kan Seng, berated the
English-language daily, The Straits Times, for what he charged as a three worrying trends
towards arousing public alarm, unbalanced reporting and crusading journalism. In particular,
he took issue with a report critical of police behaviour during an arrest. These three trends, he
warned, could not go unchecked, ‘lest they erode public confidence in the law enforcement
agencies’ (Straits Times Weekly Edition 1999). Senior Minister Lee weighed in with support
for Wong, with further reinforcement and elaboration by Prime Minister Goh. Echoing his
predecessor’s line over many years, Goh underlined the limits to the press role as watchdog:
‘If you want to set a political agenda, then you have to be in the political arena. Otherwise
you don’t have the accountability and the responsibility of looking after the place’ (quoted in
Mitton 1999: 23) 23 The Straits Times subsequently ran an opinion piece titled ‘How should
the press be positioned?’ which essentially endorsed this argument Chua 1999).
The Singapore government’s rhetoric therefore about the desirability of greater transparency
is not indicative of a revised view on the media. On the contrary, the government has been
quite explicit in insisting the role of press does not extend to enforcing public accountability
on either the government or bureaucracy.
There are strong parallels with Singapore in the constraints on the media in Malaysia. Apart
from the OSA, already discussed above, 1987 amendments to the PPPA empower the
Minister of Home Affairs to ban publications deemed contrary to Malaysian national
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interests, national security or public morality. An annually renewable publishing permit
system is built into this legislation. The ISA and Sedition Act are also available to clamp
down on the media, as was done as recently as 1987 under ‘Operation Lallang’ (Aliaran
Monthly 1997). Through two conglomerates, the domestic media are also largely owned and
controlled by political parties within the ruling coalition.24 Throughout the 1990s, prominent
local business tycoons with close connections to the ruling coalition also took a leaf out of the
Singapore government’s book. They were responsible for an unprecedented and exorbitant
string of writs against journalists and media organisations.25  Nevertheless, nothing like the
degree of systematic official monitoring, scrutiny and surveillance of the media in Singapore
was present in Malaysia. Also in contrast, as economic growth gathered momentum and
Mahathir’s political supremacy consolidated through the 1990s, official anxiety about critical
reporting moderated, even if it remained significant (Rodan 1998). To some extent this also
reflected the adoption by media organisations of more cautious reporting.
However, when the Asian financial crisis spread to Malaysia in mid-1997, Mahathir was
quick to lay blame for Malaysia’s predicament on a conspiracy of external forces, including
the international media. He observed that: ‘Quite a few people in the media and in control of
big money seem to want to see South-East Asian countries, and in particular Malaysia, stop
trying to catch up with their superiors and to know their place’ (quoted in Straits Times
1997). This was, in part, an instinctive and defensive political reaction intended to whip up
domestic nationalism. But Mahathir was also intent on minimising negative portrayals to the
international business community. Consequently, such statements were accompanied by real
changes in the reporting climate.
Almost immediately, international research and brokerage companies were threatened by
government officials that people who ‘sabotaged’ the economy could be arrested under anti-
subversion laws. This translated into self-censorship among brokerage houses, including the
public suppression of some reports, or the release of truncated versions, and avoidance of the
media (McNulty 1997). The government also announced the establishment of a committee to
screen all foreign media reports on the Internet about Malaysia, and called on the local media
to refrain from negative reporting that could be utilised by ‘foreign’ media to tarnish
Malaysia’s image (Star Online 1997).
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But the financial crisis also fanned internal UMNO power struggles that temporarily opened
up opportunities for the media to exploit, including speculation about an assumption to the
helm by Anwar. This was fuelled in part by increasingly divergent explanations of the causes
of, and remedies to, the crisis by Mahathir and Anwar. While Mahathir emphasised
international conspiracy, criticised IMF intervention in the region and repeatedly questioned
the unrestrained power of financial capital, Anwar made more reassuring noises to the
international business community and other advocates of market liberalism – including the
vast bulk of business and finance journalists within the international media.26 His quotes on
specific domestic problems and reform needs were utilised in the international press to
question and scrutinise government policy. However, a significant turning point came in June
1998, when Anwar and close ally Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, head of the UMNO Youth wing,
called for an end to nepotism, cronyism and corruption. Zahid asserted that: ‘In the current
economic situation, we should never condone nepotism whereby the interests of family
members and certain groups are given priority’ (quoted in Pereira 1998a). This was not only a
direct attack on the Prime Minister and those aligned to him,27 but precisely the sort of
rhetoric which preceded Suharto’s downfall in Indonesia.28
Mahathir’s response included a warning at the June 1998 UMNO general assembly to
‘foreign media’ not to interfere in Malaysian domestic politics and a new round of attempts to
intimidate international journalists (Pereira 1998b). At a closed-door meeting of UMNO’s
Supreme Council, Mahathir also condemned local media for critical coverage of his
government (Lopez 1998: 5). They had examined allegations of corruption, nepotism and
cronyism – including the government-sanctioned rescue of the shipping company controlled
by the Prime Minister’s son, Mirzan (Wang 1998, Lopez 1998: 5, Stewart 1998, Suh 1998).
Not co-incidentally, in July, close allies of Anwar stepped down from strategic positions in
the domestic press after the main shareholder of New Straits Times Press and TV3 appointed
a new chairman.29 The next month the chief of TV3 and another Anwar ally, Yunus Said, also
resigned.
The subsequent appointment of veteran government MP Daim Zainuddin as advisor to the
Cabinet with special economic functions undermined Anwar’s authority as Finance Minister.
Spectacular developments quickly followed. In complete contradiction of Anwar’s market-
oriented ‘bitter pill’, on 1 September 1998 Mahathir announced capital controls limiting
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short-term stock trading and withdrawing the local currency, the ringgit, from international
circulation. The following day, Anwar was sacked as Deputy and Finance Minister and
another two days after that expelled from UMNO. Far from going quietly, Anwar described
the allegations of homosexuality, sexual misconduct and abuse of power levelled against him
as part of a high-level conspiracy. His public denunciations of Mahathir and his regime
attracted large crowds who rallied behind Anwar’s call for a ‘reformasi movement’. Mass
arrests for unlawful assembly and police efforts to disperse crowds failed to deter gatherings.
Instead, Anwar’s arrest, initially under the ISA, on 20 September precipitated riots and
massive demonstrations. Official anxiety about the way the media projected, what was now, a
deep political crisis intensified.
In the initial stages of the public demonstrations, the government was especially sensitive to
images conveyed through international television. Mahathir singled out CNN and CNBC for
criticism (Wang 1998). The differences between Anwar and Mahathir were no longer the
window of opportunity they had temporarily been for reporting. On the contrary, as economic
crisis translated into political crisis, the situation changed to what one experienced
correspondent in Malaysia, Raphael Pura, described as ‘a guerrilla warfare atmosphere’
(interview 5 July, Kuala Lumpur). The formation of an UMNO defamation panel was
announced in February 1999, which, according to the panel chairman, would ‘scrutinise
accusations or statements or articles published in newspapers and magazines against the party
leadership and government’ (Straits Times 1999b)30
The government’s growing resentment of the international media was further underlined by a
directive in February for government agencies to discontinue subscriptions to the
International Herald Tribune, Asiaweek and FEER because they ‘clearly show they are
unsympathetic toward our nation’ (Associated Press 1999a).31 Cable news channel CNBC
was then moved to channel 25 - the last station on the local satellite television network, Astro
(Political & Economic Risk Consultancy 1999: 9). The political crisis had also significantly
increased the discrimination between the domestic and international press, with the latter
excluded from many press conferences involving the government, government-related
companies and the private sector. In the ensuing polarisation of the international and local
press, the latter not only adopted an even more pro-government stance than previously, but
assumed a role in attacking the former.32 As the credibility of the local media plummeted, a
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host of alternative media came to the fore - not only included the Internet, but opposition
political party organs (Chen 1999b, Pereira 1999b). Part of the government’s response to this
was to repeatedly threaten Harakah,33 the most successful alternative publication, with a ban
unless it restricted sales to party members. This intensified after the 1999 election. Harakah
and four other publications – Detik, Wasilah, Tamadun and Ekslusif – were threatened with
loss of publication licenses on various technical grounds (Ng 2000). Harakah’s editor,
Zulkifli Sulong, and the owner of the company that prints it, Chia Lim Thye, were also
charged under the Sedition Act for coverage of the Anwar trial (Elegant 2000).34
It was not just overtly political stories about Mahathir’s leadership, corruption and crony
capitalism that aroused sensitivities. Almost any negative story about the economy and its
management elicited serious official concern. This is why the NEAC Communications Team
brief included ‘clarifying or rebutting factually incorrect or misleading articles about
Malaysia’ and the Team was required ‘to monitor all statements said about Malaysia’ (Daim
1999). It thus devotes a great deal of energy to challenging media reports. One form this takes
is the writing of letters of rebuttal to individual journalists, which are simultaneously copied
to all media organisations and posted on the NEAC web site’s ‘Press Room’. Malaysian
authorities are also now writing much more frequently to newspapers to publish letters of
reply to critical pieces, sometimes with assistance from the NEAC. A less visible element of
the new public relations offensive is the attempt to cultivate journalists who are regarded as
more balanced or sympathetic. This can include selective invitations to international
journalists or organisations to attend press conferences and briefings.35 In short, a new dual
strategy of increased media surveillance and spin doctoring is emerging that has strong
resonance with established practices in Singapore.
Added to these developments, concerns about the attack on freedom of speech through
lawsuits have been considerably heightened of late. In particular, Far Eastern Economic
Review correspondent Murray Hiebert was convicted on 30 May 1997 for ‘scandalising the
court’ and sentenced to six weeks’ jail the following September. Hiebert (1997) had written
about a lawsuit brought by the wife of a Court of Appeal judge on behalf of her teenage son,
following his exclusion from a school debating team. He quoted a lawyer expressing surprise
at the speed with which this particular case was heard. After two years awaiting appeal,
during which time Hiebert was unable to leave Malaysia, he opted to start his prison term on
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September 11 1999. He thereby became the first journalist to be imprisoned for contempt in
the course of his duty since Malaysia’s independence in 1957 - and the first in 50 years in the
54-nation Commonwealth.36 Nobody has been convicted in Britain for ‘scandalising the
judiciary’ for over 70 years. Following the conviction of Christopher Lingle and the
International Herald Tribune for a 1994 article (Rodan 1998), Malaysia has joined Singapore
in a rare contemporary enforcement of this arcane law. Other recently-initiated legal cases
have also compounded the climate of intimidation for journalists and media organisations in
Malaysia.37 Cases against social and political activists for printing and publishing ‘false
news’, including the 18 month jailing of Lim Guan Eng,38 also raise serious questions about
the capacity for free expression in Malaysia (Elegant 1999).
Clearly, the Singapore and Malaysian governments’ transparency reform agendas do not
extend to any greater tolerance of critical and investigative reporting, especially that which is
in the service of increased political openness and accountability. But how does this square
with the views and needs of international business? What are the implications of this for
investor confidence?
Does Transparency Matter to Business?
Singapore was nowhere near as scathed by the Asian crisis as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia
and Korea, even though transparency levels - however measured - were among the lowest in
the city-state. This alone suggests the link between transparency and market performance is at
the very least mediated by other factors. Positive perceptions by international investors and
business analysts about political stability and the effectiveness of government in Singapore
appear to override concerns about the absence of transparency – if, in fact, significant concern
actually exists. A brief examination of the respective economic recoveries underway in
Singapore and Malaysia adds currency to the notion that the importance of transparency is, in
part, contingent upon other factors.
In 1998, economic growth stalled to just 0.3 per cent in Singapore. But for 1999 it is
officially, and conservatively, projected at 4-5 per cent. Private estimates for 1999 are around
6.3 per cent and similar for 2000 (Borsuk 1999). No less pleasing for the government than the
speedy economic recovery underway is progress in the prized financial sector. Since late
1998, substantial bond issues by Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), the Housing Development
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Board (HDB), General Electric Corp, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
and Ford, for example, have all made substantial and well subscribed bond issues.39 Assets
under fund management also grew 36 per cent in the first half of 1999 to reach S$204.1
billion, during which time the number of asset management firms managing discretionary
funds increased significantly (Loh 1999). Furthermore, stock market activity reached a new
high in the first half of 1999, nearly 20 per cent above the previous peak in June 1996 of
S$265 billion (Sivanithy 1999).
What is especially significant is that there appears to be little attempt by the international
financial community to push for broad transparency reforms. The MAS established an
International Advisory Panel (IAP) in late 1998, comprised of heads from major international
finance companies such as Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank.
Conspicuous by its absence from IAP recommendations to the MAS after its inaugural
meeting in January 1999 was any call for a free media to assist the finance sector’s
development. Asiamoney magazine also pronounced Lee Hsien Loong Asian Banker of the
Year in May 1999, with no qualifications about Lee’s hard line on the media.
Restoring international investor confidence in Malaysia has faced bigger hurdles. The
economy contracted by 7.5 per cent in 1998. Economic problems were compounded by
negative perceptions in the market about business-state relations. Criticisms and concerns
were widespread among credit rating agencies, financial analysts, business journalists, the
IMF and, most importantly, investors. The introduction of capital controls in September 1998
intensified much of this, as did Anwar’s dismissal and the political turmoil it precipitated.
Yet, during 1999, there was a decided, if not uniform, shift in market sentiment about
Malaysia. The economy is officially projected to grow by 1.0 per cent in 1999 and up to 5 per
cent in 2000 (Chen 1999d). More competitive manufacturing exports as a result of the pegged
ringgit contributed significantly to this - especially electronics exports.
In conjunction with recovery, reassessments of both political and economic conditions came
from previously critical quarters. Professional economic analysts projected much stronger
growth than official estimates, ranging from 4 to 5.6 per cent for 1999 and up to 6.3 per cent
for 2000 (Chen 1999d). A great deal of ‘talking up’ the market was discernible among those
with an interest in a positive perception of the Malaysian economy. Initially some of this
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came from Salomon Smith Barney, appointed as advisers to the Malaysian government in
September 1998 and entrusted with the task of boosting bond sales, but before long it was
widespread (Straits Times 1999c). Stockbroking house SocGen-Crosby recommended the
purchase of Malaysian stocks in early 1999 as ‘too juicy to be missed’ (quoted in Stewart
1999a). Credit ratings agencies also progressively upgraded their assessment of Malaysia’s
currency and sovereign risk. Before the year was out, Morgan Stanley announced that the
KLSE would be reinstated on the Morgan Stanley Capital International Indices (MSCI) from
the end of May 2000. These indices are widely adopted as benchmarks by international fund
managers. Malaysia had been removed from the MSCI when capital controls were introduced.
In a major public relations coup for Mahathir, World Bank Senior Vice-President Joseph
Stiglitz praised Malaysia’s achievements and argued that capital controls had been shown to
be successful in stabilising speculative money flows. This was at sharp odds with the IMF
and an endorsement of what Mahathir described as Malaysia’s ‘Sinatra Principle’: doing it
‘our way’ (Star Online 1999d, Reyes 1999a, Alford 1999a, Khanna 1999). Mahathir’s and
Malaysia’s treatment in the international press also took a turn for the better (Funston 1999).
Journalists started documenting the acknowledgements and support the Malaysian approach
had attracted. The heading of one such piece, ‘Mahathir supported in journey from lunatic to
fiscal visionary’ (Stewart 1999b), neatly encapsulated the mood swing. As election
speculation mounted, the international financial press contained increasing depictions of
Mahathir as pro-business, supported with quotes from investors emphasising the importance
of political stability. In an Asian Wall Street Journal article entitled ‘Victory for Mahathir
May Cheer Investors’ (Appell 1999), for example, one fund manager observed: ‘You have a
multiracial population and a recession. The last thing you want is to deregulate on the
political front’. In the 24 June edition of The Financial Times, Sheila McNulty also
favourably contrasted Malaysia with economic recoveries in Thailand, South Korea and
Indonesia for the absence of ‘strikes, riots and mass job cuts that others’ orthodox reforms
provoked’ (quoted in Funston 1999).
To be sure, there remain very serious reservations about the Malaysian market by sections of
international business, highlighted in the international press. Mark Mobius, Emerging Market
Fund President of Templeton Asset Management, for example, has blacklisted Malaysia out
of concerns over crony capitalism and the implications of this for minority shareholders
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(Reyes 1999b: 68-9). Similarly, David Roche, of London-based investment firm Independent
Strategy, warns that ‘Mahathir’s Miracle’ is ‘doomed to burst in a couple of years at most’
(Roche 1999). It is, he adds, ‘in no way underpinned by the factors that make sustainable
economic growth possible – namely balanced budgets, transparent financial institutions and
an efficient allocation of resources’ (Roche 1999).40 Not surprisingly, the new public relations
machinery has swung into operation to counter these views.41
It is, of course, premature to fully assess whether the absence of more substantial
transparency reforms and/or any serious shift towards greater political openness is viable in
the medium to long-term. That is a question of the systemic needs of business. But the lack of
significant progress in these areas has not prevented economic recoveries thus far of
remarkable speed and scale in both Singapore and Malaysia. To the extent that there is some
apprehension about the absence of transparency by international business, this pertains to
Malaysia by sections of finance capital. Since levels of transparency and political openness
are indistinguishable between the two countries, this suggests that the absence of
transparency, per se, is probably not the chief concern.
Conclusion
The Asian economic crisis has given birth to a new international consensus about the need for
increased and more timely and reliable information to sustain and develop markets. It is little
wonder that the leaders of two nations heavily dependent on global investment would
respond. However, the form this has taken is pragmatic accommodations to specific
informational needs of business rather than any commitment to generalised transparency
improvements. The governments of Singapore and Malaysia remain extremely nervous about
broader conceptions of transparency. Ideas about the rights of citizens to information, the
importance of a free press to more transparent and accountable systems, and attempts to
subject state institutions to greater public scrutiny are resisted with vigour.
Whether the minimal agendas preferred by the Singapore and Malaysian governments will be
sufficient to satisfy the calls for change remains to be seen. However, this international
consensus comprises diverse constituencies, interests and priorities. Neo-liberal advocacy of
transparency, for example, rests chiefly on the grounds that it can facilitate enhanced
international capital mobility – not liberal democracy (see Gill 1998, Jayasuriya 1999,
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Sinclair 2000 forthcoming). From this perspective, limited but strategic improvements in
market information, which would not necessarily include a free press, may prove adequate.
Certainly that is the premise on which the reform processes in Singapore and Malaysia appear
to be based. Leaders in these countries would be encouraged by the strength of economic
recovery to persist with this approach.
The comparison between Singapore and Malaysia also suggests that the importance of
transparency to business appears to be relative rather than absolute. How else could we
explain the extremely high degree of international business confidence in Singapore, both
before and after the crisis? As we have seen, and as the IMF has noted, Singapore lacks
market transparency in a range of basic areas. However, political stability and positive
perceptions of the government and bureaucracy mediate the impact of this on investors.
Where those perceptions are absent, as in Malaysia, transparency shortfalls arouse greater
suspicion and concern.
An argument can be made, of course, that there is a difference between the systemic
requirements of sustainable market systems on the one hand, and the perceptions of
individual investors and those regulating their environments on the other. It is too early, then,
to draw the conclusion that substantive transparency, including a free press, can be sidelined
without cost to these economies. However, if serious tensions were to emerge between
globalistaion and existing levels and forms of transparency, it is not axiomatic that deeper
reforms will ensue. That is contingent on the emergence of effective constituencies and
interests associated with greater transparency to exploit these tensions through political
action. These are more likely to come from broader social and political forces, whose
advocacy of transparency goes well beyond instrumental and economic arguments.
Ironically, authoritarian governments have now legitimated a domestic transparency discourse
that opponents can be expected to try and harness for their own causes. While this attempt is
very embryonic and ineffective in Singapore, extensive efforts are under way in Malaysia
from diverse forces. The Asian crisis has not unleashed irrepressible and objective forces of
global capitalism for transparency reform that includes political openness and a free press, but




                                                
1 All three are subscribers to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) of the IMF which was announced
in March 1996. The SDDS is intended to facilitate international capital markets through information provision.
Under the SDDS, the IMF prescribes specific economic indicators and policy data that are to be publicly
available. As from late 1996, this has taken the form of an electronic IMF Dissemination Standard Bulletin
Board. In many cases this involves hyperlinks to national Internet data sites, as with Thailand and Indonesia for
example. Their letters of intent describing the programmes of reform are also placed on the IMF Web site.
2 Underlining the World Bank’s new commitment to this idea, in an unprecedented move it joined with the
Washington-based Freedom House in its May 1999 press conference announcing its annual country rankings on
press freedoms. Press freedoms, the Bank signalled, will from here on be part of its development agenda.
3 World Bank Vice President Joseph Stiglitz (1999) is quite explicit about this. According to him: ‘A
government that engages in secrecy, making it impossible for citizens to have informed opinions about policies
that are critical to their lives and the well being of the country, weakens accountability and the quality of
decision making’.
4 Stiglitz (1999) calls form a strengthening of civil society as part of the promotion of good governance. He also
asserts that ‘ governments should not only increase transparency, but also recognize that there exists what I have
termed the basic “right to know”. Citizens have a right to know what the government is doing and why’.
5 Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong explained: ‘In the absence of information, in times of uncertainty
investors fear the worst and tend to over-react. This penalises sound, well-managed institutions together with
weaker institutions facing real problems, and can undermine the financial system’ (quoted in Tan 1998:1).
6 The new disclosures soon had an impact. Annual reports in early 1999 by two of Singapore’s leading banks ,
OUB and OCBC,  revealed details for the first time about off-balance sheet items – including contingent
liabilities, financial derivatives and other commitments – which totalled S$62 billion between them (Balan
1999). Improved property and investment details were also added to these statements. In the case of OCBC, for
instance, ‘hidden assets’ involving extensive property and land holdings turned out to be valued at S$2.11 billion
– roughly half the figure analysts had previously assumed existed (Siow 1999). Clearly, this new information
makes for better-informed market assessment of company stock.
7 http://dsbb.imf.org/
8  The new reporting is a result of SSIC 1996, which is the seventh revision of the SSIC since 1958. The SSIC is
the common framework in statistical surveys and administrative databases.
9 Letters to the NEAC Executive Director, Daim, from international wire service companies were referred to the
Team for recommendation.
10 Those GLCs listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) must observe the same regulations as required
of other public-listed companies, but, with few exceptions, GLCs are among the poorest performers in
independent rankings of corporate transparency in Singapore.10 They have also been distinctly uncooperative
with financial journalists and openly discriminatory towards international media, as have various statutory
boards and the SES itself – excluding them from important press conferences.
11 Other basic data that are concealed include information about the number and nationalities of permanent
residents and guest workers in Singapore. This restricts informed debate about the labour market, both in terms
of supply and social issues. The government may periodically release unpublished data on these matters, but this
is always at its discretion and guided by political considerations.
12 In June 1992, the local Business Times reported seemingly innocent ‘flash estimates’ of economic growth for
April and May of that year which exposed official confidentiality as less than foolproof. This led to the
economics director of the MAS, the editor and a journalist from the Business Times, and two economists from
stockbroking firm Crosby Securities being found guilty of breaching the Official Secrets Acts (OSA) (Seow
1998: 218). There has been no countenancing of a review of this Act in the wake of the crisis.
13 Tan conveyed this view in correspondence (dated 28 June 1999) to Jeyaretnam after the latter had written to
the Prime Minister (on 21 June 1999) seeking a grant to support the organisation’s activities.
14 During the Budget debate in early November 1999, DAP Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang, criticised the
government for not taking effective measures to improve off-budget transparency to reduce the problem of
‘contingent liabilities’. In particular, he called on the Finance Minister to give a full accounting of Petronas and
Khazanah Holdings.
15 Anwar contends that Perwaja’s managing director in 1996, Eric Chia, had continually claimed that his actions
had the approval of the Prime Minister. It is alleged that tendering procedures were ignored and questionable
payments were made.
16 Anwar maintains that in 1997 he reported to the Prime Minister that the Attorney-General, Mohtar Abdullah,
had preferred charges against former Malacca Chief Minister Rahim Thamby Chik, and that other preferred
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corruption charges involved International Trade and Industry Minister Rafidah Aziz. Anwar actually made a
police report claiming there was a prima facie case to prosecute Rafidah on five counts of corruption pertaining
to the allocation of shares to a family member. Anwar further claims that letters revealing Daim was the recipient
of RM600 million in shares and cash from three leading business tycoons were given to the Prime Minister
(Dalliah 1999) The tycoons were Renong’s Halim Saad, Land and General Berhad’s chairman Wan Azmi
Hamzah, and Malaysian Airlines berhad and Celcom Berhad chairman Tajuidin Ramli. Anwar lodged a police
report on 30 July 1999 charging that Daim ‘received money and corporate shares worth hundreds of millions of
ringgit’ from them. See Straits Times Interactive  (1999a).
Allegations against Rafidah and the Prime Minister’s intervention in the case were detailed in the
parliamentary speech by opposition leader Lim Kit Siang on 19 July 1999. In the same speech, Lim alleged that
contracts for mega-projects and other work had been awarded without open tender, particularly in the
construction industry which was the main provider of Barisan Nasional campaign funds. He called for the full
list of successful contractors in the interests of transparency.
17 In an attempt to undercut the political impact of Anwar’s allegations, they have been returned in kind at
consecutive UMNO annual general meetings in 1998 and 1999. In June 1999, the government released a list of
27 government projects valued at RM34 billion, allegedly awarded to Anwar and his allies. Later that year the
exercise was more focussed and coordinated. It included allegations that over 20 ‘master accounts’ worth RM3
billion had been kept by certain people on Anwar’s behalf. The US-based Asia Pacific Policy Centre was singled
out as one recipient of funds. Since it was Abdul Murad Khalid who made the allegations, there was instant
speculation about the motives behind them and claims that his accusations ‘bore the marks of one being “turned
over”’ by the Special Branch (Quek 1999, also see Yusoff 1999). In the ensuing days after Khalid’s claims,
additional allegations of corruption by Anwar from UMNO’s secretary-general Khalil Yaakob, Rural
Development Minister Annuar Musa, and Johor Mentri Besar Abdul Ghani Othman, were foreshadowed. ACA
Director-General Ahmad also wasted no time in announcing he wanted to interview Khalid about Anwar’s
alleged Bank Negara slush fund. Transport Minister Ling Liong Sik portrayed all of this as demonstration that
transparency was alive and well in Malaysia: ‘Everyone wants transparency, transparency…this is transparency
when everything is disclosed and everyone knows from A to Z’ (quoted in Star Online 1999a). For his part,
Anwar described the allegations as ‘unfounded, scurrilous and baseless’. He added that: ‘This is also a method
of shifting the focus away from the people’s properties being robbed from the nation by Datuk Mahathir
Mohammad and Tun Daim (Zainuddin) and their allies, part of which are proven in police reports and in court’
(quoted in Star Online 1999b).
18 In late May 1999, the Department of Environment had ceased posting daily readings on air quality on its web
site, citing siftware problems as the reason. Subsequently, Environment Minister Law revealed that the detailed
readings would be replaced by ratings of ‘good’, ‘moderate’ or ‘hazardous’. See Chen (1999a).
19The four parties were Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Se Islam Malaysia (PAS), Parti Keadilan Nasional
(National Justice Party) and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM).
20Bank Negara Governor, Ahmad Don, and his deputy, Fong Weng Phak, resigned following Mahathir’s
adoption of exchange controls. The new Director-General of Bank Negara is widely regarded as a political ally
of the Prime Minister.
21Yeo could not conceal his annoyance that editors would take issues such as free speech so seriously: ‘We have
witnessed many interviews on CNBC and BBC with some populist politicians in Singapore of late for frivolous
causes’ (Associated Press 1999b).
22‘During election time, the rules of campaigning must apply to these foreign channels, as they apply to TCS and
STV 12. Otherwise, some candidates may be tempted to lobby channels or even by airtime from them’
(Fernandez 1999).
23 Goh also reiterated another key plank of Lee’s position on the press, namely the right of reply. He told
journalists in early November in the Philippines: ‘If you have one whole page to criticise us, we have the right to
reply to you, you give us one whole page’ (quoted in Straits Times Interactive 1999c).
24The conglomerates are The New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) Berhad.
25This coincided with a change to the complexion of the judiciary stemming from official interventions in the
late 1980s (see Khoo 1999).
26 Anwar pronounced, for instance, that: ‘The crisis has compelled governments to accept the need for
transparency and the necessity of making adjustments and instituting reform, no matter how painful. They must
swallow the bitter pill’ (quoted in Anwar 1998).
27 Mahathir rescued his party’s commercial interets (Renong and United Engineers Malaysia), his son’s
corporate flagship (Konsortium Perkapalan) as well as the controversial mega-project, the Perwaja Steel mill,
and the national airline MAS. (see Gomez and Jomo 1999: 195-6, Alford 1999a).
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28 Indeed, at a Johor UMNO convention a short while later, Anwar warned that without reforms Malaysia was
headed down the same path as Indonesia (Pereira 1998a).
29 Abdul Rahman was appointed chairman of Malaysian Resources Corp (MRCB) after replacing Nazri as the
leading shareholder of Realmild, which controls MRCB. MRCB is the main shareholder in NSTP and Sistem
Televisyen Malaysia (TV3).
30 The Panel had lodged more than 21 reports to police by October 1999, including alleged cases of sedition,
defamation and contempt (Star Online 1999c).
31 Deputy Education Minister Fong Chan Ong also explained that: ‘These publications are giving blatantly one-
sided coverage on the political and economic situation in Malaysia and putting us in a bad light in the eyes of the
world’ (quoted in Deutsche Presse-Agentur 1999).
32 In an editorial titled ‘Anwar and the vengeful foreign press’ on 27 September, New Straits Times editor Kadir
Jasin criticised the British press in particular for ‘their eagerness to malign the Government and the law-abiding
citizens of this country’.
33 Harakah is the oficial newspaper of the Parti Se Islam Malaysia (PAS).
34 Harakah was deemed by the Home Minstry to be in violation of its permit by selling a political part
publication in places other than the party headquarters and to non-party members. Other publications were
brought into question for covering political stories when their permits did not allow this. Harakak has begun
reducing its production as a step towards complying with the directive, but PAS has also applied for a new
publication license for another publication, Purnama, and is speculating about an Internet edition of Harakah as
well.
35 Daim, for instance, has nominated to Dow Jones organisations certain journalists he would and would not
want at certain meetings.
36 Hiebert served four weeks before being released and subsequently withdrew his appeal after it was deemed
that he would have to return to Malaysia to attend the appeal and deposit a RM2000,000 security deposit.
Hiebert’s lawyers observed that: ‘We are not aware of any jurisdiction in the Commonwealth that requires an
appellant who already has served his sentence to continue to attend court proceedings’ (quoted in Straits Times
Interactive 1999b). He had already taken up a new post in Washington.
37These include: two defamation cases by Mirzan Mahathir pertaining to an article about Malaysia Inc. in the 4
January 1999 edition of Asian Wall Street Journal - one of RM200 million against the Journal and the other
against its Malaysian Printers, Star Papyrus (Asian Wall Street Journal 1999); and another RM200 million
defamation suit by Vincent Tan, Berjaya Group chairman and chief executive, against the same defendants over
‘Malaysia Props Up Crony Capitalists’, penned by Malaysian academic K.S. Jomo in the 21 December 1998
edition of the Asian Wall Street Journal. These cases sit alongside earlier and yet unresolved cases, together
with settlements outside of court involving journalists and media organisations.
38Lim Guan Eng, an opposition parliamentarian and prisoner of conscience, was sentenced to 18 months jail for
sedition and printing ‘false news’. His conviction related to the publishing of a pamphlet in 1995 entitled
‘Cermah Kisah Benar’ (‘The True Story’), which prosecutors argued contained false information on a sex
scandal involving a schoolgirl and a former government chief minister. At the time, Lim was both a
parliamentarian and National Chairman of the Democratic Action Party. In a separae case, Women’s rights
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